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Military Reserve Plan
••• Tho He Decide Justly, Cannot Be Considered

J.

by HON. STROM THURMONDU. S. Senator, South Carolina, Democrat

Senator Thurmond, who is President of the Reserve
Officers Association, appeared before the House Armed
Services Committee to testify on behalf of the ROA on
February 24, 1955. The following extracts are taken from
his remarks.
"THE RESERVE OFFICERS Association supports fully
the broad objectives and aspects of the administration's
plan to strengthen the Reserve Forces. It does, however,
disagree with some of the details of the bill being considered and also certain of the purposes which this bill is
designed to accomplish.
"The bill before you is, in essence, a manpower procurement bill dealing primarily with the problem of securing
enlisted manpower for the reserves and effecting a higher
degree in participation in the reserve training programs.
"This Association is in accord with the concept that
every able-bodied, male American owes, as an obligation
of citizenship, a certain amount of service to the Military.
This is service either with the active forces, the reserve
forces, or in combination thereof. It does not agree that
this period of obligatory service should exceed eight years.
Furthermore, it feels that this period of obligation should
be subject to reduction by the President when force levels
have been reached in the active forces and in the expanded reserve in order that the manpower pool may not
increase beyond the minimum figure necessary to provide
a source of recruitment for the regular military establishment. Failure to hold the manpower pool to minimum
levels will result in many young men escaping service,
and the average age of inductees increasing to unacceptable figures.
"The Association believes that the sources of manpower
for the reserves should be two and two only.
"The first source would be from prior service personnel
with remaining periods of obligatory service, or those who
have discharged their obligatory service who can be induced to remain in the reserve on a voluntary basis. The
second source would be non-prior service men who enlist
in the reserve components throughout the country and
· immediately thereafter go on active duty for training for
a period of six months. After this training is completed
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they then return to their reserve units for a period of
seven and one-half years. All services sl10uld be required
to use both methods. The numbers who would be trained
would be the maximum consistent with the existence of
facilities and available funds. It should be noted that the
Department of Defense recommends this training plan be
· on a carefully controlled basis and, it is our understanding,
intends it to apply only to the Army, the Marine Corps,
and the Coast Guard. It should be noted that under their
present program the Navy is following a somewhat similar
plan which they call 'Accelerated Reservists Training.'
Consistent with the position stated above, we recommend
that a floor be placed under the number that would be
trained by this method, and that this floor would be
150,000 trained annually for all the military services. It
should be borne in mind that this floor represents only
75,000 man years of trainees which should not tax the
training facilities of the military establishment to a significant degree.
"The bill before you establishes a total of five million
men in the reserves, divided between a 3,000,000 man
re-defined Ready Reserve and a 2,000,000 man re-defined
Standby Reserve.
"It is the opinion of the Association that the total reserve should consist of approximately three million reservists. We would recommend that the three million
Ready Reserve, as recommended in this legislation, be the
total reserve and that the Standby Reserve, as recommended in this legislation, revert to the general manpower pool. The Standby Reserve, as recommended in
this bill, cannot be ordered to active duty except with
the approval of the Selective Service. Furthermore, this
bill provides no opportunity for training in the Standby
Reserves except on a volunteer, unpaid basis and offers
no opportunity for promotion or advancement to its
members. It is our opinion that it is not a reserve at all
and adds nothing to the security of our country.
"The Association would not change the present definitions contained in the Reserve Forces Act of 19 52 for
the Ready, Standby, and Inactive reserves, although we ·
would suggest changing the name of the Standby Reserve to 'Mobilization Reserve.' A careful study of these
existing de~nitions shows clearly that they accomplish
precise]y the. same objectives as the new definitions sugContinued on page 113
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gested by the Department of Defense with the exception
of the control by Selective Service over the proposed
'Standby Reserve.'
"The main difference between our positions is one of
size. The Association would divide the three million men .
in the Ready Reserve, as recommended by the Dep~~tmeqt of Defense, into a Ready, Standby, and Inactive
Reserve as established by present law. The Ready Reserve would be the only part of tl1e reserve wl1ich would
be subject to the call of the President. In our opinion
this should not exceed one and a half million men. In
the Association plan the million and a half in the Ready
Reserve would be divided into two groups of similarly
trained and equipped units and individuals. The first
would be a so-called 'Hurricane' force, the second, the
'Support' force:
"The term 'Hurricane force' is not intended to be a
legal term but is rather a descriptive term. This force,
backed up by the 'Support' force with only a slightly less
degree of immediate readiness, would constitute our
Ready Reserve. Membership in this 'Hurricane' force and
'Support' force would be encouraged by special inducements and incentives, including, but not limited to, extra
emoluments, identifying and distinctive uniforms or markers, and priority receipt of full combat equipment ?nd
realistic training facilities. To the greatest extent possible
it would be manned by prior service personnel who would
be induced to serve in the Ready Reserve force. This
Ready Reserve would be subject to the call of the
President.
"The balance of the three million total reserve would
be in the Standby Reserve and woul_d be organized,
equipped, and trained precisely the same as the ~ea~y
Reserve. It would have, however, a lower degree of pnonty
of achieving operational readiness.
"We know that it will be argued that a larger Ready
Reserve is required, but we believe that such a concept,
as expressed in the legislation before you, stems from_ ~ar
plans designed to meet the requirements of full mobilization. It is recognized that the next war may start by an allout attack on our country. That, of course, would bring
in 011 reserves with the fullest support of the Congress.
"However, we cannot accept a concept that we should
tie our ready reserve structure to a plan that would require the use of 3,000,000 men .in addition to our active
forces. There may be other types of small wars whi~h
will require a partial mobilization on a very urgent bas1~.
If such is the case, a relatively small Ready Reserve 1s
imperative. If, however, the entire three million is needed,
then it is our opinion that such a need stems from total

war. Certainly there will not be such damage that the
Congress could not take any action necessary to permit
the use of all reserves.
"One of the major deficiencies in the bill under discussion was its failure to recognize the absolute need to
provide for an orderly flow of young reserve officers into
the reserve program. Basically, such officers come into the
Reserve through the ROTC program. Under present conditions the purposes of this program have been distorted
to become a procurement program for the needs of the
active services. The primary purpose of the ROTC program is to provide young officers to meet mobilization requirements. The Association feels that this bill should
include specific authority and direction that the ROTC
program be re-designed to meet its est~~lis~ed miss~on
to provide the officer personnel for mob1hzabon reqmrements. We recommend that the numbers in the program
be consistent with that objective and that upon graduation all ROTC graduates will be commissioned. Those in
excess of mobilization requirements will be ordered to
active duty for training for six months and then attached
to reserve units for a period of seven and one-half years
obligatory service.
"There is much talk of inducements and incentives to
improve interest in and the morale of reservists. The present low morale and low efficiency of the reserves stems
from certain easily correctible faults on the part of the
regular establishment. There has, in the past, not been an
acceptance of the concept by a part of the regular establishment that the reserves are an integral part of our total
military structure and not a mere adjunct to the :egul~r
establishment. This has resulted, unfortunately, m discrimination and attitudes, particularly in personnel .procedures, which can only indicate that in the minds of
some regular personnel a reservist is a second-class member of the ·military team.
"Another matter which we earnestly recommend for
the consideration of the Committee is the fact that we
should endeavor to clean up-once and for all-the problem of reservists who have served on continuous active
duty for such periods of time that they, in fact, have become career personnel.
"Without such reservists, the armed forces cannot possibly meet their commitments. Over 80 pe:cent of the
officers of the Air Force and Army on active duty are
reservists. Sma11er percentages prevail in the Navy and
Marine Corps. We know of no line of endeavor where an
employee who works for the same employer for a period
of ten, fifteen, or twenty years is not considered a career
employee. Yet these reserve officers who are holding r~sponsible positions on active duty and are as well quahContinued on page 115
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fied as the so-called regular, who frequently has had the
same education and the same type of service training and
record as the reservist, are not 'career' men. Human nature
being what it is the reservist on active duty is constantly
being discriminated against in matters of promotion, command assignment, retirement, etc.
"Therefore, we suggest to this Committee that an
amendment be written into this Reserve legislation to
provide that, except in time of war or general mobilization, when a reserve has been on continuous active duty
for a period of eight years that he will at that time be
screened for fitness to be retained on active duty. If he
is deemed to be fit for retention he will be given the
opportunity to be integrated in his present rank and
status. This will solve a great many of the problems which
now plague us all and it certainly will bring about a
higher degree of morale and efficiency on the part of
individuals who have been living under the shadow of
forces beyond their control."

by MAYNARD M. BORING
Chairman, Engineering Manpower Commission

Mr. Boring appeared before the House Armed Services
Committee, March 1, 1955, on behalf of the Engineers
Joint Council and the Scientific Manpower Commission.
A portion of his views on H.R. 2967 follow.
"IT IS WIDELY recognized now that national security
has come to depend increasingly upon the capacity of the
country to produce goods, materials and services necessary
to maintain a strong and flexible economy as well as to
develop and produce the world's most superior weapons.
We know that the manpower requirements for this purpose grow larger every day because of the increasing complexity of our technology and that no assessment of the
availability, or plan for the use of manpower for national
security or for any other purpose can be complete without
consideration of these ever-growing requirements. We
know too that we cannot hope to match our potential
adversaries in terms of mere numbers of men. We realize,
as a result, that in a unique way the preservation of our
way of life will depend not only on the maintenance of
strong military forces but on our keeping a safe lead in
the technological race which is very evident in the background of preparation for conflict. It is more evident now
than ever that scientific knowledge plus engineering equals
power as never before in the history of the world.

"We think it is not only appropriate but necessary to
mention here that this lesson has not been lost on our
potential enemies. Recent studies and analysis of the
educational structure and its product irl the Soviet Union
provide unmistakable evidence that the entire educational .
structure there has been and is polarized in the direction
of the fullest exploitation of its intellectual potential for
engineering and science. Until recently it was fashionable
to discredit the quality of Russian technological effort in
the face of its growing quantity. We now have increasing
evidence that this attitude on our part constituted 'whistling in the dark.' Our smug self-confidence in our continuing technological superiority is in the process of dilution by growing concern.
"The National Science Foundation, in its annual report
for the year ending January 30, 1954, presents some information on the ratio of workers in our economy to engineers and scientists and other technicians. It provides the
information that in 1870 there were 1,100 workers for each
engineer and scientist. By 1910 the number of workers had
decreased per engineer and scientist to 200. In 1950 there
were only 60 workers to each engineer and scientist in the
United States. The real quantitative implications of this
for technological manpower cannot be understood until
we realize that our industrial working force has grown
enormously during this same period. With these facts in
mind we can understand why our tremendous industrial
structure would be seriously weakened by the withdrawal
of too many of its brains.
"In the case of engineers, about half of our resources
have been graduated from engineering schools since 1947.
It is not surprising that in spite of this we have experienced in this country since 1950 demand for these
persons far beyond available supply. Many of us are convinced that, indeed, in terms of the educational development of our professional potential in our country to meet
the technological demands of our times, we have already
reached the ceiling unless extensive programs are launched '
to encourage a proportional increase in the number of our
qualified young people who actually go on to some kind
of professional training. I mention this only to indicate
that in the event of an emergency, our resources of highly
trained manpower on hand will without question be the
major ultimate limiting factor in our capacity for mobilization. It is our firm conviction that our resources in
technological manpower would barely be adequate to
meet all known and probable national security needs only
if they were properly distributed between and efficiently
utilized by military and supporting productive activities.
In other words, it is of the utmost importance that we
learn to make the most of what we have because the
promise of absolute increases in the supply are poor inContinued on page 117
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